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I. INTRODUCTION 
This research seeks to shed light on one professional group 
practicing in the Israeli Occupied Territories: defense lawyers 
representing Palestinians before the Israeli military courts. These 
lawyers—Israeli and Palestinian—are important actors within a 
judicial apparatus, which has been in place since 1967, and is part of a 
prolonged military occupation.1 Over the years, the military court 
system in the Occupied Territories has taken several steps to 
professionalize, mainly by incorporating numerous universal features 
that characterize civil courts operating in liberal democracies.2 These 
include the exclusion of lay judges (non-jurist military personnel) from 
the bench, the adoption of special trial procedures for minors, allowing 
appeals on interim and final decisions, and generally amending the 
military substantive and procedural rules to resemble those of the 
Israeli civil system.3 
Almost all Palestinians charged in military courts are represented 
by a defense lawyer, Israeli or Palestinian.4 The Israeli defense lawyers 
are members of the Israeli Bar Association (“IBA”) and are governed 
by the Israeli law regulating professional practice—The Israel Bar 
Association Act of 1961.5 Israeli lawyers are also bound by the ethical 
rules promulgated by the IBA, and by Israeli court decisions 
interpreting the law, role, and duties of lawyers.6 Palestinian lawyers 
are members of the Palestinian Bar Association. After the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority (“PA”) following the Oslo 
Accords of 1996, the legal profession in the PA began to 
 
1.  GEORGE E. BISHARAT, PALESTINIAN LAWYERS AND ISRAELI RULE: LAW AND 
DISORDER IN THE WEST BANK (1989). 
2.  Smadar Ben-Natan, Inside and Outside Israeli Law: The Application of Israeli Law in 
the Military Courts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 43 THEORY & CRITICISM 45 (2014) 
(Isr.) [hereinafter Inside and Outside Israeli Law]. 
3.  Id. 
4.  YESH-DIN, BACKYARD PROCEEDINGS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS IN THE MILITARY COURTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (2007).  
5.  Bar Association Act, 5721-1961, 178 (1960-61) (Isr.). 
6.  NETA ZIV, WHO WILL GUARD THE GUARDIANS OF LAW? LAWYERS IN ISRAEL 
BETWEEN THE STATE, MARKET AND CIVIL SOCIETY (2015) (Isr.). 
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institutionalize.7 To date, ten law schools operate in the PA where 
Palestinian students can obtain a law degree.8 In 1997, the Palestinian 
Bar Association was established, the PA enacted a law regulating the 
legal profession, and a professional ethical code for Palestinian lawyers 
was adopted.9 These professional developments took place as the 
Israeli occupation continued, which included the prosecution of 
thousands of Palestinians each month before the military courts and 
their incarceration in Israeli prisons for security and criminal offenses 
committed in the occupied territories. 
Hence, the Palestinian legal profession has been institutionalizing 
in the context of two political processes. The first is the PA’s course of 
“state building,” which required the formation of an independent 
justice system, including an autonomous and professional bar.10 The 
second is the ongoing national conflict, including a military occupation 
that has lasted for over fifty years.11 From the Israeli side, the military 
courts have increasingly endeavored to resemble—at least formally, 
structurally, and procedurally—normalized judicial institutions, 
despite being courts that operate under a military regime.12 
Representation before the military courts takes place with close 
proximity to the issue of political/security prisoners—a highly potent 
and contested topic both within the PA, as well as between Israel and 
the Palestinian representative bodies.13 What the military justice 
 
7.  Mutaz Qafisheh, A Century of the Law Profession in Palestine: quo vadis?, 25 INT’L J. 
LEGAL PROF. 175 (2018). 
8.  Mutaz M. Qafisheh, Modern Legal Education in Palestine: The Clinical Programs of 
Hebron University, in EXPERIMENTAL LEGAL EDUCATION IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: THE 
MIDDLE EAST & BEYOND 198-235 (Mutaz M. Qafisheh & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, eds., 2016). 
9.  Id. 
10.  Qafisheh, supra note 7. 
11.  See generally David Kretzmer, The Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme 
Court of Israel, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 207 (2012); ORNA BEN-NAFTALI, MICHAEL 
SFARD & HEDI VITERBO, THE ABC OF THE OPT: A LEGAL LEXICON OF THE ISRAELI CONTROL 
OVER THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 264 (2018). 
12. Ben-Natan, supra note 2. 
13.  See infra note 69; Government of the State of Palestine, PERMANENT OBSERVER 
MISSION OF THE ST. OF PALESTINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS N.Y., http://palestineun.org/about-
palestine/government-of-the-state-of-palestine/ [https://perma.cc/AKL9-HH2U]. The Israeli 
government considers the PA’s support for Palestinians convicted of security offenses—
including providing financial support to their families, as well as other forms of support such as 
legal defense—as unacceptable. The government has initiated legislative steps to authorize the 
government to deduct the sum the PA provides families of convicted offenders from the amount 
of money Israel transfers to the PA (e.g., mainly taxes collected in relation to Palestinian 
workers). See, e.g., Shahar Hay, Knesset passes bill to deduct terror funds from PA in first 
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system regards as an illegal act and a punishable offense is often 
considered an act of political resistance in the eyes of Palestinians. 
Hence, defense lawyers perform their work on a finely delineated line 
that embodies multiple aspects and different layers of interactions 
between the professional/legal and the political. As they mediate 
between their clients and the Israeli military regime, they can either try 
to politicize the process, or take part in the law’s pacifying and 
normalizing role within the occupation. 
By focusing on defense lawyers practicing before the court, this 
research aims to probe into their practice and better understand the 
interplay between the legal and the political in representing clients 
before the military courts. The inquiry wished to reveal: who are the 
lawyers that appear before the “courts of the enemy”? What are the 
formal and informal regulatory regimes that govern their practice? 
What are the lawyers’ motivations for doing this work? Who pays their 
fees? Do they consider themselves part of the Palestinian political 
struggle or professionals dedicated mainly to the wellbeing of their 
individual clients? Who do they owe their fiduciary duties to? Do they 
believe they are legitimating the Israeli occupation or is their practice 
part of the political struggle against it? How do they demarcate the 
relationship between the professional and the political? Have the 
answers to these questions changed over time, as lawyers continue to 
practice before “the judicial arm of a control regime that has been 
deemed the longest military occupation in modern history”?14 
Part II lays out the literature on the military courts and the lawyers 
practicing before them. Part III describes the human rights legalistic 
critique of the military justice system, and Part IV analyzes how this 
same discourse affects the interplay between the professional and the 
political on the practice of defense lawyers. Part V portrays the 
regulatory regime that applies to each group of lawyers and Part VI 
discusses the makeup of this particular professional group. Part VII 
describes the research method applied in this project and Part VIII the 
main findings. The Article concludes by questioning the legitimizing 
force of legal representation before the Israeli military courts. 
 
reading, YNET NEWS (May 8, 2018), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
5254508,00.html [https://perma.cc/B6WM-XS2A]. 
14.  BEN-NAFTALI, SFARD & VIRTEBO, supra note 11, at 264. 
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II. MILITARY COURTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES – 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The military courts operating in the Occupied Territories are part 
of a comprehensive and complex legal system that applies in these 
areas. This system consists of an amalgam of legal sources. They 
include local law - civil law (mainly Jordanian law, and after the Oslo 
Accords, Palestinian law) and religious law (relating to family and 
personal status issues), as well as international law (international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law), as well as 
military law (orders issued by the Israeli army, which cover almost all 
areas of life). 
The topic of the law of occupation has been addressed extensively 
in academic writing, with a particular focus on the role of the Israeli 
judiciary in the review of military action in the territories.15 This 
literature constitutes the general background for my research, which 
addresses one institution within this system—the military courts and 
specific professional actors within them: defense lawyers. These 
lawyers work amidst two additional professional groups: military 
prosecutors and military judges. 
Military courts operating in an occupied territories are recognized 
under international law, specifically in Article 66 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.16 In the Israeli context, they were established through 
military orders promulgated immediately following the occupation in 
1967,17 and since 1970, the basis for their operation has been Security 
Provisions Order No. 378.18 The military courts’ jurisdiction includes 
 
15.  For most recent references, see generally AEYAL GROSS, THE WRITING ON THE 
WALL: RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2017); Kretzmer, supra note 
11; EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2nd ed. 2012); BEN-
NAFTALI, SFARD & VIRTEBO, supra note 11; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION (2009); MICHAEL KARAYANNI, CONFLICTS IN A CONFLICT: A 
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASE STUDY ON ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (2014). 
16.  Article 66 of The Fourth Geneva Convention states: “In case of a breach of the penal 
provisions promulgated by it by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 64, the Occupying 
Power may hand over the accused to its properly constituted, non-political military courts, on 
condition that the said courts sit in the occupied country. Courts of appeal shall preferably sit in 
the occupied country.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, art. 66 (1949) [hereinafter The Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
17.  Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Military Government—The Initial 
Stage, in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967–
1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 14 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982). 
18.  LISA HAJJAR, COURTING CONFLICT: THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE 
WEST BANK AND GAZA (2005); Sharon Weill, The Judicial Arm of the Occupation: The Israeli 
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security related offenses committed in the territories as well as criminal 
offenses without any security component (such as theft, bribery, tax-
related offenses, environmental offenses, traffic violations, domestic 
violence, and assault). Following the establishment of the PA, there 
have been detailed provisions regulating the jurisdiction of these courts 
regarding offenses committed within the jurisdiction of the PA.19 Even 
though military courts’ jurisdiction covers offenses committed by 
Jewish settlers, this population, by and large, is not tried in these courts, 
but in civil Israeli courts, within Israel.20 
Weill labels the military courts “the judicial arm of the 
occupation,” Hajjar identifies them as “both a product and site of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” and Cavanaugh posits that the military 
courts are “at the intersection of politics and law.”21 They are a central 
component of the Israeli army’s apparatus that maintains, controls, 
sustains, and normalizes the prolonged Israeli occupation.22 They are 
also an established, dominant and familiar institution among 
Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories, since most families 
have experienced some encounter with their judicial régime—either 
directly or indirectly.23 
It is estimated that since the beginning of the occupation, over 
800,000 Palestinians had been prosecuted in the military courts, for 
both security-related and criminal offences.24 According to data 
provided by Israeli sources, each year a minimum of 12,000 
indictments are filed before these courts.25 Since almost all of these 
cases end with a plea bargain, and suspects tend to be kept in custody 
for prolonged periods, this judicial process also coincides with an 
 
Military Courts in the Occupied Territories, 89 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 395, 401 (2007); 
YESH-DIN, supra note 4. 
19.  HAJJAR, supra note 18, at 46. 
20.  B’TSELEM, LAW ENFORCEMENT ON ISRAELI CIVILIANS IN THE OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES (1994). 
21.  Weill, supra note 18, at 1; HAJJAR, supra note 18, at 1; Kathleen Cavanaugh, The 
Israeli Military Court System In The West Bank and Gaza, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 197, 
205 (2007). 
22.  Weill, supra note 18. 
23.  HAJJAR, supra note 18 (courting conflict) 
24.  Nethanel Benisho, Criminal Law in the West Bank and Gaza, 18 IDF L. REV. 299 
(2005); Weill, supra note 18, at 396; Neri Ramati, From Security Interrogations to Criminal 
Evidence: Methods of Interrogation by the General Security Services and the Police of 
Palestinians Accused of Security Offenses in the Military Courts (2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
25. Ramati, supra note 24. 
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extremely high level of incarceration.26 For example, during February 
2016, 6,700 Palestinians from the West Bank were incarcerated in 
Israeli prisons, out of a population of 1,800,000 Palestinians in the 
West Bank.27 
Research on the legal and institutional aspects of the military 
courts has been conducted through different lenses over the prolonged 
Israeli occupation. First, several military officials that had taken part in 
the establishment and operation of the courts documented their formal 
basis and modus operandi. Meir Shamgar, who served both as Judge 
Advocate General (“JAG”) in 1967, and later as Israel’s Attorney 
General and President of the Israeli Supreme Court, documented the 
legal basis of the occupation in its early stages, including the military 
courts.28 Zvi Hadar, who was the JAG following Shamgar, also 
described the legal framework and structure of the military courts.29 
Amnon Strashnov, who served as president of the military courts and 
then as the Israel Defense Force’s (“IDF”) JAG during the 1980s, 
documented in his book Justice Under Fire, the legal apparatus in the 
occupied territories during the first Palestinian uprising, including the 
role of the military courts therein.30 Nethanel Benisho, who currently 
serves as the President of the military courts, documented the later 
period of military courts’ operation, as well as the relationship between 
the law applied in Israeli courts and that in military courts.31 
Second, international law scholars have pointed to the unique 
character of the military courts under The Law of Occupation. 
Cavanaugh describes the formal regulatory framework of the courts, as 
well as the main features of their actual practice, and Kretzmer 
critically analyzes the Supreme Court’s limited oversight of their 
jurisdiction. Through the indeterminate and fungible legal concept of 
territorial jurisdiction, Sharon Weill demonstrates how the military 
courts assumed jurisdiction over offenses committed extraterritorially 
 
26.  ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, PRESUMED GUILTY: 
FAILURES OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 
(2009). 
27.  Ramati, supra note 24. 
28.  Shamgar, supra note 17, at 14. 
29.  Zvi Hadar, The Military Courts, in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES 
ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967–1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 193 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982). 
30.  AMNON STRASHNOV, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE (1994). 
31.  Id.; Benisho, supra note 24. 
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(for example, in Area A, under the control of the PA), thereby creating 
a “borderless judicial domination.”32 
A third line of research on the military courts applies a socio-
political methodology. In 1989, Bisharat published the first book that 
explored the status and the role of Palestinian lawyers in the West Bank 
(as labeled by the author), during the first two decades of the 
occupation.33 Bisharat described the lawyers as a disintegrating 
profession, and explained how the lawyers’ strike, declared soon after 
the occupation, in fact, led to the profession’s decline and 
fossilization.34 Bisharat continued to examine these lawyers a decade 
later, again focusing on the intersection between lawyers’ professional 
identity and the multiple political constraints surrounding their 
practice.35 As part of his exploration, he discussed the dilemma of 
legitimating the occupation through representation in the military 
courts.36 Lisa Hajjar’s work on the military courts provides a hard look 
at the perplexity of Israel’s claim to pursue “justice” within a non-
democratic military legal regime.37 Hajjar’s fieldwork offers an 
ethnography of the military courts from various points of view (those 
of access, language, physical setting, and actors), and included 
meetings and interviews with lawyers practicing in these courts.38 
Smadar Ben-Natan has conducted extensive work on the military 
courts in recent years. Her focus has been on the consequences of the 
application of Israeli legal norms and standards in the military courts.39 
Ben-Natan suggests that the move towards “legal harmonization” can 
be understood as Israel’s response to the criticism alleging that it 
violates procedural and substantive norms of international human 
rights law in the military courts.40 She claims that this move towards 
legal-resemblance, in fact, hinders access to justice to the military 
courts. It also weakens the application of international humanitarian 
law during analysis of the legality of the occupation (by stressing 
 
32.  Weill, supra note 18, at 417. 
33.  BISHARAT, supra note 1. 
34.  Id. 
35.  George E. Bisharat, Courting Justice? Legitimation in Lawyering under Israeli 
Occupation, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 349, 365–405 (2005). 
36.  Id. 
37.  HAJJAR, supra note 18. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Smadar Ben-Natan, The Honey Trap: The Application of Israeli Law in the Military 
Courts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2014) (unpublished MSt. dissertation, Oxford 
University) [hereinafter The Honey Trap]. 
40.  Id. 
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international human rights law) and brings the reality on the ground 
closer to a permanent occupation, if not de facto annexation, of the 
occupied territories.41 
The military courts have been continuously monitored by 
numerous human rights organizations over the years. These include 
Palestinian human rights organizations,42 Israeli human rights 
organizations,43 and international human rights groups.44 The central 
findings of these reports underscoring flaws in due process and 
procedural failings that amount to human rights violations of 
Palestinians prosecuted in the military courts, will be discussed in the 
next section. As explained above, partially as a response to this critique, 
the military orders introduced procedural and substantive amendments 
to the court’s regulatory regime, in an attempt to move them closer to 
the Israeli courts’ standards.45 
Finally, the military courts have been explored in a unique and 
powerful documentary film, entitled “The Law in These Parts.”46 The 
film documents the establishment of the military legal system in the 
occupied territories beginning in 1967, through testimony of military 
legal professionals who had been its legal and institutional architects.47 
The well-designed nature of the military courts’ apparatus and the 
 
41.  ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, supra note 26; ADDAMEER 
PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, DEFENDING PALESTINIAN PRISONERS: A 
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF DEFENSE LAWYERS IN ISRAELI MILITARY COURTS (2008); RAJA 
SHEHADEH & JŪNĀTHĀN KUTTĀB, THE WEST BANK AND THE RULE OF LAW (Int’l Comm’n. of 
Jurists, Geneva eds., 1980). 
42.  For Palestinian human rights organizations, see, e.g., ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT 
& HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, supra note 26; SHEHADEH & Kuttāb, supra note 41. 
43.  For reports by Israeli human rights organizations, see, e.g., B’TSELEM, PRESUMED 
GUILTY: REMAND IN CUSTODY BY MILITARY COURTS IN THE W. BANK (2015) [hereinafter 
PRESUMED GUILTY]; B’TSELEM, NO MINOR MATTER - VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF 
PALESTINIAN MINORS ARRESTED BY ISRAEL ON SUSPICION OF STONE THROWING (2011) 
[hereinafter NO MINOR MATTER]; NO LEGAL FRONTIERS, ALL GUILTY! OBSERVATIONS ON 
THE MILITARY JUVENILE COURT (2010-11); YESH-DIN, supra note 4; B’TSELEM, supra note 
20; B’TSELEM, THE MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE WEST BANK (1990) [hereinafter THE 
MILITARY COURT SYSTEM].  
44.  For reports by international human rights organizations, see, e.g., LAWYERS’ COMM. 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LAWYERS AND THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM (1992); AMNESTY INT’L, 
ISRAEL ET TERRITOIRES OCCUPÉS: JUSTICE MILITAIRE EN TERRITORIES OCCUPÉS [ISRAEL AND 
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES] 
(1991); INT’L COMM. OF JURISTS, INQUIRY INTO THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE 
OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA (1989). 
45.  The Honey Trap, supra note 39; Inside and Outside Israeli Law, supra note 2. 
46.  THE LAW IN THESE PARTS (Ra’anan Alexandowicz ed., 2011). 
47.  Id. 
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unremitting ways in which they took part in the institutional 
legalization of the prolonged military rule, clearly demonstrate how 
these courts had transformed into “the judicial arm of the 
occupation.”48 
III. THE MILITARY COURTS—HUMAN RIGHTS, LAW, AND 
POLITICS 
As described above, since the 1980s, numerous human rights 
organizations have monitored and scrutinized the Israeli military 
courts. Their activity is part of a broader effort under which human 
rights groups have observed and documented human rights violations 
in the Occupied Territories. This approach utilizes the human rights 
lens—through established standards, benchmarks, and norms—to 
evaluate the critique that military courts cannot, and do not, function as 
fair and independent judicial institutions, given their structural 
affiliation with the military government. Hence, the human rights 
approach differs from that of international humanitarian law (“IHL”). 
While the Geneva Convention requires that military courts be 
“properly constituted” and “non-political” (and that they sit in the 
occupied territory), the human rights framework requires adherence to 
additional norms.49 
Early in the occupation, human rights reports addressed essential 
flaws in the operation of the military courts and the military justice 
system in general.50 Their main points were the lack of an appeals 
court, the membership of lay (non-jurist) military personnel on the 
bench, and failure to notify families of the whereabouts of a detainee. 
They also challenged the practice of preventing lawyers and detainees 
from meeting, lack of special procedures for minors, as well as the 
length of the detention period before judicial review. These were 
accompanied by complaints regarding inadequate physical access to 
the courts, language barriers, failure to bring detainees to hearings and 
their postponement, and other administrative flaws.51 
A significant part of this critique focused on the period that 
preceded formal judicial hearings, during which detainees were held in 
 
48.  As coined by Weil, supra note 18. 
49.  GROSS, supra note 15. 
50.  See SHEHADEH & KUTTĀB, supra note 42; THE MILITARY COURT SYSTEM , supra 
note 43. 
51.  SHEHADEH & KUTTĀB, supra note 41. 
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custody and interrogated by security personnel.52 During this period, in 
which external scrutiny was limited and it was difficult to access a 
lawyer, most detainees rendered a confession to the accusations against 
them.53 The detainees would remain in custody, and the court would 
rarely remand bail.54 Consequently, the main function of the court was 
reduced to approving a plea bargain between the prosecution and the 
accused, mediated by a defense lawyer.55 
As decades of occupation went by, and the temporary nature of 
the occupation had lost most of its meaning—human rights law, due 
process principles, and legalistic discourse have become vital parts of 
the law of occupation—at least formally and rhetorically.56 This trend 
has infiltrated the military courts as well. An appeals court was 
established in 1989, and lay judges were removed from the bench.57 A 
designated court for minors was established with special procedures 
(such as holding hearings in camera and limiting the interrogation of 
children without their parents), and, in general, the military penal code 
was gradually harmonized, to a substantial degree, with the Israeli 
penal code.58 
From the point of view of military personnel, this process led to 
improvement in the court’s functioning and better adherence to human 
rights norms.59 Critical scholars and human rights activists 
acknowledged that the procedural measures introduced increased 
professionalization, independence, and impartiality.60 However, they 
pointed to the limitations of such measures to counter the court’s 
fundamental partiality and prejudice: legalization may have led to an 
appearance of procedural justice, but it did not touch the core problems 
 
52.  See ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, supra note 26, at 17-
20. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. 
55.  B’TSELEM, supra note 20; ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, 
supra note 24; NO MINOR MATTER, supra note 43; B’TSELEM, PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 
26. 
56.  See GROSS, supra note 15; Orna Ben-Naftali, PathoLAWgical Occupation: 
Normalizing the Exceptional Case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Other Legal 
Pathologies, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW: PAS DE DEUX 129–200 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011). 
57.  Ben-Natan, Inside and Outside Israeli Law, supra note 1. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Zvi Lekah, Protecting Human Rights in the Military Courts in the Era of the Fight 
Against Terror, in THE MORDECHAI KREMNITZER BOOK 641 (A. Bendor, H. Gnaim, I. Saban, 
eds., 2017) (Isr.). 
60.  Ben-Natan, The Honey Trap, supra note 39; GROSS, supra note 15. 
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of the system.61 Moreover, some claimed that the salience of the human 
rights discourse overshadowed adherence to norms under IHL and the 
law of occupation.62 
Despite legalization, Israeli, Palestinian, and international human 
rights organizations persisted in their critique of the court, pointing to 
entrenched problems of various sorts. First were the unchanged 
conditions of pre-trial detention and interrogations, which led to a 
compelling tendency for confessions.63 Absent any significant 
modification of these pretrial procedures, most cases in military courts 
continued to end in a plea bargain.64 The military court affirmed 
confessions that were allegedly obtained based either on a rational 
calculation of a risk of a harsher outcome, or because of difficulties in 
conducting a full trial, while the accused remained in custody.65 
Second, some of the formal procedural safeguards, especially those 
relating to minors, were simply not observed in practice.66 Third, many 
decisions of a military judge were discretionary, and depended on 
acceptance of the prosecution’s or the defense’s argument.67F67 Military 
judges, for the most part, ruled in favor of the prosecution, and rejected 
the positions of the defense.68F68 
Be the reason as it may, this tendency was said to reveal the 
unevenness of the military court and its impartiality. Under this line of 
thought, since the military courts were established by the military 
regime and constitute part of the military occupation’s apparatus, they 
must serve the system upon which they rely. Within a highly potent 
political conflict, they are the final institutions that transform “acts of 
resistance” into criminal charges. Despite enhanced legalism, the 
courts cannot perform as equalizers; by and large, they do not bridge 
the power gap between the occupier and the occupied. 
 
61.  The Honey Trap, supra note 39. 
62.  GROSS, supra note 15. 
63.  ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, supra note 26. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. 
66.  NO MINOR MATTER, supra note 43. 
67.  ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, supra note 26. 
68.  ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS’N, supra note 26. 
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IV. FUSING THE PROFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL—DEFENSE 
LAWYERS 
The tension between formal legalization and substantive justice 
described above applies, similarly, to the professional sphere and to the 
defense lawyers practicing before the military courts. Arguably, more 
law opened up opportunities for novel legal arguments, in particular 
claims regarding violations of procedural due process. In theory, 
enhanced legalization meant that lawyers could harness their 
professional skills to the advantage of their clients, exploiting 
opportunities for professional interventions. They could detect a 
violation of a detainee’s rights during interrogation, claim lack of 
sufficient evidence to support extended detention, demand remedies 
based on flaws in the treatment of minors, and the like. In Part VIII, the 
Article explores this potential for professional intervention. 
Concurrently, the mass processing of thousands of cases before 
the military courts, their institutionalization, and professionalization, 
impacted the Palestinian polity as well. The PA government includes a 
Ministry for Prisoners’ Affairs.69 The Ministry covers the costs of the 
defense of Palestinians charged with security offenses in the military 
courts.70 The office retains lawyers to provide representation through 
renewed annual retainer agreements and other fee arrangements.71 In 
addition, a number of Palestinian and international NGOs located in the 
territories fund legal aid for political prisoners. These include the 
Addameer Prison Support and Human Rights Association, Defense for 
Children International, and the Palestinian Prisoners’ Club [Nadi El-
Asir Al Falestini], who pay lawyers to provide legal defense in the 
military courts.72 
Alongside this apparatus, an informal (but politically powerful) 
Committee of Prisoners’ Affairs (“the Prisoners’ Committee”) operates 
from within the Israeli prisons and maintains close contact with the 
Ministry of Political Prisoners.73 The Prisoners’ Committee has 
 
69.  Government of the State of Palestine, supra note 13. 
70.  Interview with J.B., attorney (Feb. 19, 2018). 
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. 
73.  On the activities of The Palestinian Committee of Prisoners’Affairs, see, e.g., Calls for 
saving hunger-striking prisoners in Israeli jails, PALINFO (Sept. 14, 2016), 
https://english.palinfo.com/news/2016/9/14/Calls-for-saving-hunger-striking-prisoners-in-
Israeli-jails [https://perma.cc/4EUP-WBCS]. 
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occasionally intervened on topics relating to prisoners’ status and 
conditions, including legal representation before the military courts.74 
Hence the web of institutions, laws, personnel, policies, 
procedures, and other types of regulation have created a multi-faceted 
space within which the defense lawyers work. The law is but one factor 
within this complex framework. To be sure, the process of legalization 
and professionalization underscores the professional aspects of the 
defense lawyer’s potential and actual work. However, these traits 
intertwine with the political aspects and the social context of their 
lawyering. Therefore, the core questions remain: to what extent do 
these new professional opportunities impact the representation of 
defendants in the military courts? What do defense lawyers think about 
them? How have they affected the defense bar practicing before these 
courts? 
To this point, Ben-Natan has strongly argued that participating in 
the legal game reinforces and strengthens the illusion of justice, without 
tackling the underlying flawed foundations of military rule and the 
military justice system.75 Ban-Natan asserts that the legal amendments 
and new procedures have, in fact, imposed additional hurdles upon 
lawyers—especially Palestinian lawyers who do not speak or read 
Hebrew.76 She claims that they had worsened the lawyers’ 
opportunities for effective representation and in fact situated them at a 
disadvantage.77 Ben-Natan, however, does not claim to bring the voices 
of the Palestinian lawyers themselves on this matter; rather she offers 
a viable point of view regarding the impact of legal harmonization on 
their professional role. 
My research, detailed below in Parts V, VI, VII, and VIII, offers 
a complementary perspective on this point, based mainly on interviews 
with lawyers about the courts, their professionalization, and the 
lawyers’ role within the system. It suggests that the defense lawyers 
themselves carry ambivalent and mixed attitudes towards the military 
courts, and about their role as lawyers within this system, the meaning 
of practicing law under military rule, and the fusion of the political and 
professional. It also demonstrates that despite being a small group, the 
defense lawyers are not a monolithic group, and voice different views 
on these topics. 
 
74.  Id. 
75.  The Honey Trap, supra note 39. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Id. 
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V. REGULATORY REGIME—FORMAL RULES AND INFORMAL 
POWERS 
There are multiple formal and informal regulatory regimes that 
govern defense lawyers practicing before the military courts. First, 
lawyers must abide by the national (state) rules regulating the legal 
profession. 
Israeli lawyers are governed by the Israeli Bar Association Act of 
1961, and the bylaws and regulations promulgated under this law.78 
They are members of the IBA, to which they pay yearly membership 
dues; Israeli lawyers are subjected to the IBA’s disciplinary jurisdiction 
and ethical standards.79 
Palestinian lawyers are governed by the Palestinian Civil 
Advocates Law (formerly named The Legal Profession Law No. 3).80 
They are members of the Palestinian Bar Association (“PBA”), pay 
dues to the organization, and practice under its jurisdiction.81 The 
Palestinian lawyers are covered by the PBA’s pension scheme and are 
governed by its professional and ethical norms.82 
However, the territorial jurisdiction of these laws and professional 
organizations is limited to Israel and the PA and does not extend to the 
occupied territories.83 Since they practice in the occupied territories, 
defense lawyers are under the jurisdiction of the military rules and 
orders promulgated by the military commander. Sections 74-85 of the 
Order Regarding Security Provisions (“the military order”) address the 
topic of “Parties and their Representatives” in the military courts and 
relate to legal representation.84 Sections 74 and 76 of the military order 
state that defendants in the military courts have a right to be represented 
 
78.  Bar Association Act, supra note 5. 
79.  See Issachar Rosen-Svi, Constructing Professionalism: The Professional Project of 
the Israeli Judiciary, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 760, 780 (2001); Eli Salzberger, Kesher 
Hamishpetanim Hayiśraeli: Al Lishkat Orkhe Hadin Uba’ale Brita [The Israeli Jurists 
Conspiracy: On the Israeli Bar and its Allies], 32 MISHPATIM 43 passim (2001) (Isr.); Neta Ziv, 
Combining Professionalism, Nation Building and Public Service: The Professional Project of 
the Israeli Bar 1928–2002, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1621, 1640–49 (2003); NETA ZIV, WHO WILL 
GUARD THE GUARDIANS OF LAW? LAWYERS IN ISRAEL BETWEEN THE STATE, MARKET AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY (2015) (Isr.). 
80.  Law No. 5 of Dec. 28, 1999 Concerning the Amendment of Legal Profession Law No. 
3 of 1999, PALESTINE GAZETTE No. 32, at 5 (Feb. 29, 2000) (Palestine). 
81.  Qafisheh, supra note 7, at 17. 
82.  Id. 
83.  The IBA and PBA may, however, discipline lawyers for unethical behavior that does 
not have territorial dimensions, such as general criminal behavior. 
84.  Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5770-2009 (Isr.). 
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by an Israeli lawyer or a Palestinian lawyer—labeled “a local 
lawyer.”85 Under certain circumstances, a defendant may be appointed 
a lawyer by the military court, which also determines the fee paid to 
the appointed lawyer, as per Sections 77, 83, and 84 of the military 
order.86 In Section 80, the military order conditions the replacement of 
a lawyer upon the approval of the court,87 and, in Section 82, states that 
the court will not refuse to approve switching a lawyer, unless the 
change might lead to an unreasonable postponement of the judicial 
proceedings.88 In Section 85, the military order details a (gendered) 
dress code for the lawyers appearing before it.89 
Other than these rather few provisions, the military order provides 
no guidance on the additional aspects of defense lawyers’ conduct, nor 
are there any ethical norms that apply to them. As in any court, the 
presiding military judge is authorized to control and discipline conduct 
in the courtroom, and this includes the power to require lawyers to 
conduct themselves in a proper manner. The military court’s de-facto 
power to police lawyers’ behavior relates, first of all, to issues of 
civility and etiquette, including the duty to speak when addressed, the 
requirement to not arrive late or fail to show up, as well as guidelines 
regarding talking to family members present in the courtroom. It also 
covers the role of lawyers as officers of the court and their part in the 
administration of justice. This includes the lawyer’s duty of candor 
towards the court, the prohibition against lying to the court, the duty to 
reveal the existence of a former proceeding relevant to the case at hand, 
and the like.90 In the military courts, judges often exercise this 
authority. 
Alongside these formal rules, defense lawyers are indirectly 
subjected to policies and decisions of the PA, in particular the Ministry 
of Prisoner Affairs and the Committee for Prisoners Affairs. The fee 
structure implemented by the PA establishes a multi-party relationship 
between the lawyers, the clients, the military courts, and the PA itself. 
As will be explained below, the impact of the fee arrangement is highly 
determinate within the construct of representation.91 It creates 
 
85.  Id. §§ 74, 76. 
86.  Id. §§ 77, 83, 84. 
87.  Id. § 80. 
88.  Id. § 82. 
89.  Id. § 85. 
90.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.6, 1.7, 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
91.  Infra Part VIII(D). 
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incentives for lawyers to maintain a certain caseload, since the lawyers 
become dependent on the income generated by these fees. The fee 
structure is also relevant to questions of legitimacy of representation. It 
enables the lawyers to hold the PA responsible for “cooperating” with 
the military government and the occupier’s courts. Hence, it absolves 
them from taking personal or collective professional responsibility for 
the legitimation of the military courts, as fair and objective legal 
institutions. 
This construct of representation is not unidimensional. Given the 
high caseload in the military courts—thousands of cases a month—the 
courts rely on the presence of defense lawyers to process their cases in 
an orderly and smooth manner. As will be discussed below, the military 
courts have become entirely dependent on the defense lawyers and 
cannot operate without them.92 Military judges rarely make a judicial 
move without the detainee or accused being represented.93 Hence, the 
defense lawyers have turned into an integral element within the military 
judicial system. 
Defense lawyers are also in close and constant contact with 
prisoners’ families. A lawyer is usually contacted and hired by a 
detainee’s family. Family members look upon them as crucial 
mediators between the detainee and the military bodies. Families are 
often involved in decisions during the hearings, such as the amount of 
bail and the terms of the plea bargain, and the lawyers convey 
information between the detainee and the family during “in real time” 
representation. 
VI. DEFENSE LAWYERS—MAKEUP AND PRACTICE 
Observations and interviews conducted as part of my research 
revealed the following findings. Currently there are about sixty to 
seventy defense lawyers practicing before the military courts. About 
forty percent of the lawyers are Israeli. Most of them are Arab citizens 
of Israel or residents of East Jerusalem, and a handful are Jewish. Some 
of the Israeli lawyers studied in Israeli law schools and others studied 
abroad (mainly in Jordan). The larger group of lawyers that practice 
before the military courts are Palestinian lawyers who are members of 
the PBA. They studied law in a variety of law schools, most of them in 
the Middle East (Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and North Africa) as well as 
 
92.  Infra Part VIII. 
93.  Infra Part VIII. 
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in the occupied territories, where currently ten law schools operate. 
Most of the lawyers are men, and there are fewer than ten women in 
this practice. 
For most defense lawyers, practicing before the military courts is 
their sole, or main, professional occupation. This means that they 
appear in a military court between four and five times a week and 
remain in the court compound most of the day. Since the military courts 
operate inside military bases, the defense lawyers spend most of their 
working time in a secluded, Israeli military environment. 
The lawyers’ counterparts are military prosecutors, military 
judges, and the court’s logistic and administrative personnel. These 
include guards (some belonging to the police and some to the IDF), 
court translators, secretaries, and other administrative staff responsible 
for processing the trials. All these functionaries wear military uniforms 
and belong to the military apparatus maintaining the occupation. 
Within this unique, if not peculiar, environment, the defense 
lawyers constitute a distinctive professional group. Although small in 
number, this group of lawyers is not monolithic. Each one has 
constructed his or her rationale about the politics of representation and 
has adopted a form of reasoning to account for his or her professional 
role within the military courts. 
Therefore, the objective of this research was to better understand 
the formal norms and informal forces that influence the identity and 
practices of defense lawyers in the Israeli military courts. Its goal was 
to explore the intertwining of the professional and the political during 
representation, as well as the politics of representing political/security 
prisoners given the significance of this group and topic within the 
Israeli-Palestinian context. In general, the research wishes to unveil a 
legal site where law and politics interplay intensely, and in which the 
legal profession plays an important role. 
VII. RESEARCH METHOD AND SETTING 
During the months of March, July, and August of 2017, and 
during the first part of 2018, I conducted research on defense lawyers 
in military courts. This stage of the research included ten visits to the 
military court in the Ofer army base near Ramallah. Each visit lasted 
between two and four hours. Being a licensed member of the IBA, I 
accessed the court as any other lawyer would. At times, I was 
accompanied by Arabic-speaking law students, who obtained ad-hoc 
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permission to join me during these visits. In principle, the courts are 
open to the public. In practice, one has to obtain a permit to enter, as 
the courts are part of a closed army base. 
The physical layout and architectural design of the court deserve 
special attention. Entrance into the compound requires one to go 
through a security check and to pass through a number of metal 
electronic gates. Palestinians—including defendants who are not 
detained and family members of the detainees—enter the compound 
through a different gate, and are allotted a number of waiting areas, in 
which they remain until called to enter the courtroom. There are seven 
courtrooms (constructed as prefabricated units), set in a row, in which 
different hearings take place. Separate rooms are designated for pre-
trail detention hearings, juvenile trials, appeal hearings, plea bargains 
and full trials, and administrative detention hearings, among other 
purposes. 
There is a physical separation between the areas where families 
wait, the “middle yard,” where the detainees are held in custody, and 
the “back yard,” where the lawyers, prosecutors, and military personnel 
have their offices. One cannot freely pass between the family waiting 
area and the middle yard and back yard. The different courtrooms are 
connected to each other by a wall/fence, in a way that blocks passage 
from one side of the base to another. As a result, the most common way 
to move between the different court areas is through the courtrooms 
themselves. 
Each courtroom has at least three doors: one for the use of 
families/defendants/public, one for the judges, and one for the lawyers 
and the detainees. This constellation leads to constant “traffic” within 
the small courtrooms. Lawyers keep going in and out of the courtroom, 
“cutting in” through one door and “cutting out” through another, in 
order to get from one side of the compound to the other. Some of the 
courtrooms are small, and the lawyers have to squeeze themselves to 
pass through, especially when a number of detainees wait in the 
detention area in the courtroom (behind a low wooden bar), 
accompanied by their security guards. All this commotion occurs while 
the judicial hearings continue. Since the lawyers often have hearings 
that overlap in scheduling, a loudspeaker is used to summon them, as 
well as to summon family members that are called to enter the 
courtroom to attend the hearing of their relative. Family members go 
in and out of the courtroom as hearings continue and make constant 
attempts to communicate with the detained family member, and are 
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frequently interrupted by the judge, who requires they refrain from 
doing so. 
This setup often leads to a somewhat chaotic feeling, which 
unexpectedly also creates a certain atmosphere of informality and 
casualness in the courtroom. Since judges, prosecutors and defense 
lawyers are repeat players in these proceedings, they all seem to 
recognize (and adhere to) the blurred boundaries between the formality 
of the procedure and the loose ambience during which the trials take 
place. I sat in court and observed different hearings, motions, and trials. 
Judges were, for the most part, accommodating, and did not impose any 
difficulties during my observations. Occasionally present in the court 
were observers from Israeli NGOs, mainly women peace organizations, 
that operate “court-watches” over court proceedings of women 
defendants. 
I conducted interviews with sixteen defense lawyers.94 Most 
interviews took place during the lunch breaks in the court hearings, in 
the lawyers’ meeting room, or in the base’s open-air cafeteria. Two 
interviews were held in a lawyer’s office in the occupied territories and 
one in Tel Aviv (a Jewish lawyer). Most lawyers, but not all, were 
accommodating and were happy to discuss their work with me. With 
some, there were language barriers that could not be overcome. Others 
were suspicious and did not want to talk. One lawyer, for example, 
explained that the mere consent to be interviewed by an Israeli 
academic legitimates the occupation and the military judicial 
proceedings. He refused to take part in the research. 
After my fourth or fifth visit to the court, more lawyers were 
willing to meet and discuss various aspects of their work, despite some 
ambivalence, suspicion, and hesitance some continued to express 
during the interviews. Each interview lasted between forty-five and 
ninety minutes. Eight interviews were recorded. Seven lawyers were 
members of the IBA; six were members of the PBA; three were 
members of both bars, but these lawyers first became members of the 
PBA and then took the Israeli bar exam. The dual membership lawyers 
resided in East Jerusalem.95 Out of the sixteen lawyers, I met four 
women. 
 
94.  Apparently, Hamas lawyers act separately. However, I did not meet any. 
95.  The Israel Bar Association Act requires members to be residents of Israel, rather than 
citizens (section 42). Residents of east Jerusalem, most of whom are not citizens of Israel, can 
become members of the Israeli Bar Association. 
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VIII. FINDINGS 
A. Practice Conditions 
My research, observations, and interviews resulted in the 
following findings. Most lawyers are repeat players in the military 
court system. Their practice is constituted almost entirely of 
representing defendants in the military courts, since it is difficult to 
commit to other cases given the caseload and intensity of scheduled 
hearings. This means that they come to court almost every day (four to 
five times a week), and most have been doing so for years. 
When a lawyer has a case scheduled in the military court, he 
usually has to remain there at least half of the day, if not the full day. 
Cases are not necessarily scheduled in a consecutive manner for the 
same lawyers, and often they need to wait for hours between cases. As 
a result, the lawyers find themselves spending most of their working 
time in the military court compound. The base itself is quite small, and 
the IDF personnel (professional and lay) remain in the same space. This 
enables the lawyers to become familiar and to develop working 
relationships with the prosecutors, judges, and administrative staff. 
They work in a military base together. They buy food and drinks in the 
same canteen and visit the same administrative offices of the courts. 
This is a rare situation of physical “mingling” between Israeli soldiers 
and Palestinians. 
Given this setting, military judges know lawyers by name, as well 
as by professional style and character. They often refer to them by their 
first names. For example, during one hearing, a judge, somewhat 
humorously, alluded to a lawyer as being “tough” and a “hardliner,” 
while the other was referred to as more accommodating. More 
accommodating means, as an example, agreeing to additional delays or 
postponements in the hearing of the case, due to the prosecution’s 
failure to bring a witness on its behalf. Witnesses are heard in cases in 
which the defendant did not confess, or when the prosecution’s request 
for detention pending trial is contested. However, the prosecution often 
fails to present witnesses for a variety of reasons. Some witnesses are 
soldiers on duty at the time of the event who have since been released 
from the army. In other cases, witnesses are Palestinian “collaborators” 
of some sort, and do not want to come to court to testify. This is a case 
where the defense lawyer can insist on either releasing the client or can 
use this failure during plea-bargaining as a consideration for a more 
lenient sentence. There are some lawyers who are more assertive than 
750 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:2 
others in such circumstances, and judges, who are familiar with the 
lawyers’ attitudes—insinuate their views on the lawyers’ modes of 
representation. 
B. Differentiating Israeli and Palestinian Lawyers—The Question of 
Professionalism 
The interviews I conducted revealed a clear distinction, if not 
stratification, between Israeli and Palestinian lawyers. To begin with, 
most Israeli lawyers speak Hebrew, while most Palestinian lawyers do 
not. It is therefore more difficult for Palestinian lawyers to navigate the 
military justice system and to represent their clients. In theory, 
interrogation materials need to be provided to the lawyers in Arabic 
(some investigations are conducted in Arabic, the spoken language of 
most defendants), but lawyers pointed to problems with obtaining this 
material in a sufficient manner. The court hearings themselves are 
conducted in Hebrew (though some judges seem to be fluent in Arabic), 
and translators are provided. The opinions on the quality of translators 
(usually Druze military personnel) were mixed. However, most 
lawyers admitted there are severe problems with translation. 
Israeli lawyers frequently criticized (some) Palestinian lawyers 
referring to their professionalism. They recognized the strong 
incentives for defense lawyers to “work with the system,” by entering 
a plea on behalf of the client. However, they distinguished between 
cases in which a plea bargain seemed to be the right professional 
decision (where there were no detectable procedural flaws, and the 
evidence against the accused was clear and substantial), and 
circumstances in which it was possible to raise legal arguments on 
behalf of the client. Such arguments would include, for example, that 
procedures were not followed (for example a minor was detained 
together with adults), or that the evidence against the defendant is weak 
and can be contested, so the lawyer can modify the indictment or 
mitigate the sentence (usually as part of a plea bargain). 
Israeli lawyers repeatedly claimed that for various reasons some 
Palestinian lawyers do not operate this way: they are quick to enter a 
plea bargain, rarely challenge the evidence, raise no legal arguments, 
and “trade” prospects of different clients in order to maintain a good 
relationship with the prosecution.96 
 
96.  This was a common allegation. The caseload of Palestinian lawyers, especially those 
on the payroll of the PA, is extremely heavy. It includes defendants with severe, as well as 
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In contrast, one senior Israeli lawyer who works with a Palestinian 
prisoner rights organization offered a different way to understand this 
conduct (which in and of itself was not contested). He claimed that 
Palestinian lawyers can be “good lawyers” within the unjust system of 
the military courts. He argued that these lawyers, even if they do not 
speak Hebrew, and even if they cannot challenge evidence against their 
client or detect procedural failures, should not be judged according to 
such universal professional standards. Under this view, the typical 
professional expectations from a legalistic lawyer assume a justice 
system that is fair and impartial. Since the military courts fail to meet 
these attributes, the role of defense lawyers should be redefined against 
an unfair institutional reality, and the definition of professionalism 
should be adjusted accordingly. Purportedly, the Palestinian lawyers 
have learned to navigate the military justice system through its own 
rationalization and institutional routine—the processing of thousands 
of cases smoothly and orderly, which results in pacifying the resistance 
against the occupation. Within this political context, it is unrealistic to 
expect that good conventional lawyering will lead to any sort of justice. 
Therefore, many Palestinian lawyers do the best they can: they meet 
their client and provide emotional support, they maintain contact with 
the family, and they try to get the best plea deal for their client while 
working with and alongside the military prosecution, and by 
maintaining a reasonable working relationship with the system. 
These are two different ways to think about the role of lawyers 
and about professionalism. The Israeli lawyers defined professionalism 
in universal terms, underscoring the learned aspect of their work as the 
central indicator of what it means to be a good lawyer. In contrast, the 
senior Israeli-Palestinian lawyer offered a contextual understanding of 
this term, which takes into account a reality, five decades long, of an 
occupying force’s justice system that does not live up to its own claims 
of fairness. 
If we understand professionalism in these different meanings, it 
can explain the findings described in section H below, that all 
lawyers—Palestinian and Israeli—stated it was possible for them to be 
“good” and “professional” lawyers in the military court system. This 
 
lighter, offenses. Since plea bargains are an outcome of negotiation with a prosecutor – all of 
which are repeat players in the system – Palestinian lawyers need to maintain a workable 
relationship with the prosecution. The claim is that they often do not negotiate each case 
individually on its merits, but exchange benefits and “deals” among different clients they 
represent. This was considered to be unethical and unprofessional by some lawyers. 
752 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:2 
determination depended upon the way they related to the military 
justice system and how they managed the fusion of its legalistic and 
political components. 
C. The Quandary of Plea Bargaining 
My research showed that all lawyers referred to the problem of 
plea bargains as an essential, ingrained predicament within the military 
court system. The strong inclination to resort to plea bargains in the 
military courts is the outcome of two sets of features. 
The first is more substantive—the absence of lawyers from the 
preliminary stages of the detention and investigation. As explained in 
Part III, most detainees are arrested by the army or the police in the 
territories, and they remain in custody in detention centers for 
interrogation, under conditions that make it extremely difficult for 
lawyers to meet with them.97 They must be brought before a judge for 
extension of the detention after ninety-six hours (if suspected of a 
security offense) or forty-eight hours (if suspected of a criminal 
offense).98 In addition, in security-related offenses, the IDF or the 
General Security Service are authorized to prevent a meeting with a 
lawyer for fifteen days, a period that can be extended by the military 
court.99 As a result, many detainees arrive in court after they have 
already confessed to some offense, making it difficult for the lawyer to 
conduct a hearing or a trial with evidence and witnesses. 
Second, the military court system is highly burdened with 
thousands of cases each month.100 Therefore, it heavily relies on plea 
bargains—which take a few minutes at the most to approve—in order 
to process the caseload. To a large extent, lawyers are discouraged from 
litigating cases and are encouraged to enter plea bargains. A number of 
lawyers admitted that their chances of getting a more lenient sentence 
for their client decreases if they choose to conduct a full trial (called an 
“open trial”), compared to the “deal” they can obtain through a plea. 
This dilemma in and of itself is not foreign to criminal defense 
lawyering and constitutes a well-recognized phenomenon in the 
criminal justice system at large. In the military courts, however, this 
 
97.   See supra Part III.  
98.  Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5770-2009, § 31, 31A, 31B 
(Isr.). Special provisions are set for minors. 
99.  Id. §§ 58-59A. 
100.  Ramati, supra note 24. 
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occurrence is exacerbated. The reason is the lack of significant 
oversight and screening of cases at the initial investigation stages, 
which takes place in the Israeli civil system, in which weaker and 
unsubstantiated cases that will not lead to indictments are weeded 
out.101 The lack of similar screening in the military justice system—
which has a much higher detention rate—allegedly leads to a higher 
percentage of cases brought to trial, and among these over ninety-nine 
percent end with a conviction. 
From the lawyers’ perspective, the plea bargain quandary cuts 
through the heart of their professional experience. Most lawyers 
reflected upon this dilemma arduously, revealing a lucid recognition of 
the institutional straits within which they conduct their work. The 
reality under which they are expected, and in fact do submit themselves 
to the “plea pipeline” revealed itself as a source of constant personal 
and professional frustration. It is therefore not surprising that lawyers 
do feel a sense of professional achievement if and when they are able 
to divert from the plea bargain track and actually do the work of a “real 
lawyer.” This complexity about plea bargains also explains the critique 
voiced by some of the lawyers towards others, regarding the abuse of 
the plea system, explained above. 
D. Impact of the Palestinian Authority 
My research revealed that defense lawyers in the military courts 
are influenced by the PA in a number of ways. First, as mentioned 
above, the PA Ministry of Prisoners Affairs and the prisoners’ NGOs 
pay the lawyers to represent defendants and detainees in the military 
courts.102 Most lawyers are hired on a retainer basis, through yearly 
renewable contracts. They are therefore obliged to take representation 
and, accordingly, many have very heavy caseloads. 
A number of lawyers mentioned that they used to work with the 
PA and the NGOs but have ceased to do so for a number of reasons. 
 
101.  For example, according to the Israeli State Attorney Report for 2017, almost forty 
percent of investigation cases referred to the State Attorney’s Office ended with no indictment, 
following screening by the police or another investigatory agency. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 
STATE ATTORNEY REPORT FOR 2017 (2017) (Isr.), http://www.justice.gov.il/
Units/StateAttorney/Documents/data-report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FNV-6CMN]. In 
contrast, human rights organizations report a very high percentage of detentions leading to 
indictments of Palestinian detainees and a policy to release detainees. See PRESUMED GUILTY, 
supra note 26. I have not found equivalent data on number of investigations conducted compared 
to number of indictments in the Occupied Territories. 
102.  See supra Part IV. 
754 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:2 
The first is the lack of discretion about the number and type of cases 
they can handle, resulting in a loss of professional independence. The 
second is their notion that criminal defense has in and of itself become 
an “industry,” a source of a steady and stable income that turns the 
NGOs, as well as the lawyers, into stakeholders in the continuance of 
the occupation. Another lawyer complained about the lack of 
supervision by the NGOs and the PA over lawyers’ competence and 
the quality of representation, hence their unwillingness to be affiliated 
with criminal defense. 
The relationship between the defense lawyers and the PA/NGOs 
is, however, more complex than merely providing the means to 
represent defendants and detainees. The PA cooperates with the 
Palestinian Committee of Prisoners’ Affairs, established by the PLO 
(“Palestinian Liberation Organization”).103 This committee is the body 
that provides financial support to the Palestinian prisoners’ families.104 
Although moneys are channeled through the PA, the committee 
remains an important political actor in the prisoners’ affairs. This 
financial support includes the fees for lawyers’ representation of 
defendants and detainees in the military courts. The affiliation between 
the PA and the committee is complex and affected by the relationship 
between the PA and the Israeli government. Israel had demanded that 
the PA dissolve the prisoners’ committee, objecting to payments made 
by the PA to Palestinian prisoners and their families.105 As part of this 
position, in 2018 the Israeli government-initiated legislation to 
authorize it to cease transfer of funds to the PA because of its support 
of prisoners.106 The legislation is pending.107 
 
103.  See supra Part IV and accompanying notes. 
104.  See supra Part IV and accompanying notes. 
105.  See, e.g., Dov Lieber, Defying US, Palestinian official vows payments to terrorists 
will continue, The Times of Israel (June 14, 2017), https://www.timesofisrael.com/defying-us-
palestinian-official-vows-payments-to-prisoners-will-continue/ [https://perma.cc/GP36-
YCPW]; Al-Resalah: Abbas plans to dissolve Palestinian Committee of Prisoners’ Affairs, 
MA’AN NEWS AGENCY (June 19, 2017), https://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=777713 
[https://perma.cc/VZA8-YC8U]. 
106.  In general, the Israeli government considers the PA’s support for Palestinians 
convicted of security offenses – including providing financial support to their families, as well 
as other forms of support such as legal defence - as unacceptable. The government has initiated 
legislative steps to authorize the government to deduct from the moneys Israel transfers to the 
PA (mainly taxes collected in relation to Palestinian workers) the sum the PA provides families 
of convicted offenders. See e.g., Shahar Hay, Knesset passes bill to deduct terror funds from PA 
in first reading, YNEY (May 8, 2018), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
5254508,00.html [https://perma.cc/YYP3-RU95]. 
107.  Id. 
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Meanwhile, from time to time, the prisoners’ committee exercises 
great influence in relation to Israeli prison conditions and affairs, 
including through declaring prison strikes on various grounds. For 
example, in April 2017, the committee declared a hunger strike of all 
Palestinian prisoners, mainly related to policies of family visitation to 
prisons.108 As part of the strike, defense lawyers were instructed to 
suspend their representation and not to appear in the military courts.109 
The lawyers interviewed reported that all lawyers obeyed this 
instruction. The expectation to comply with this collective decision 
was, apparently, unambiguous, and there was no room for individual 
non-compliance. The court strike lasted for a few days, during which 
court hearings were disrupted and entered a state of disarray, to the 
point that the court administration considered appointing Israeli 
lawyers to replace the lawyers on strike.110 However, the strike ended 
shortly thereafter and representation resumed. 
E.  Defense Lawyers and Families 
The interviews I conducted, along with my observations, showed 
that most lawyers underscored the significance of their relationships 
with their clients’ families and explained that serving as a liaison 
between client and family is an integral part of their professional 
mission. Most often, the first approach to a lawyer is carried out by a 
family member, and the lawyer remains the family’s prominent linkage 
to their detained family member during the period of detention and 
imprisonment. 
Most lawyers seemed to take for granted their function as support 
providers for the families. One lawyer explicitly described herself as a 
“social worker” in addition to being a lawyer, and in general, this 
responsibility seems to blend into the “job description” of the defense 
lawyer.111 During the court hearing, the role of the lawyer is amplified. 
Families may attend the hearing (up to two members), and the court is 
 
108.  See, e.g., Hundreds of Palestinian prisoners in Israel go on hunger strike, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/17/palestinian-
prisoners-israel-hunger-strike [https://perma.cc/QY9J-WT8J]; Mass Palestinian hunger strike 
in Israeli jails ends after visitation deal, THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/27/mass-palestinian-hunger-strike-israel-ends 
[https://perma.cc/CU9N-UASU]. 
109.  Interviews (July 2017). 
110.  Id. 
111.  Id. 
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the place where they see the detainee and can perceive their wellbeing. 
Since the family is not permitted to formally engage with the detainee 
(through touching or passing belongings), the lawyer bridges this 
distance. There are situations in which decisions about the amount of 
punitive fines are reached by the family member, with or without the 
client being involved. For example, the customary rate of exchange 
between a fine and jail time is ILS1,000 (the equivalent to about 
US$300) for one month of jail time. There were cases in which this 
negotiation was conducted between the lawyer and the family member 
first, and afterwards the client’s consent was obtained. 
F.  Motivations for Military Court Practice 
In my interviews, I found that lawyers expressed a mixture of 
motivations for practicing in the military courts. Some stated that it was 
work with a good and steady income, insinuating that representation 
became simply another routine job. Most lawyers, however, 
emphasized in some way or another the political dimensions of their 
work. 
Most lawyers underscored the individualistic aspect of their work 
as embodying political dimensions—assisting a person involved in the 
struggle against the occupation; one lawyer described his work as “my 
way to assist in the resistance to the occupation”; another explained 
that the practice keeps him within the inner circles of knowledge about 
the politics of resistance to occupation. Another lawyer claimed his 
main motivation was to provide quality representation to the families 
of detainees, to counter poor and unethical representation of other 
lawyers. One lawyer talked about his motivation to “do justice” for his 
clients, something he believed could be done in the military courts. A 
number of lawyers explained that representation is what lawyers do as 
“witness bearers” to the injustice done by the occupation. In this sense, 
lawyers’ participation in the judicial process is considered part of a 
historical, collective act documenting a counter-narrative to that 
forwarded by the State of Israel of an enlightened occupation. At the 
same time, one lawyer explained that he has been working in the field 
for so many years, that it was hard to leave, though he would have liked 
to. 
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G. The Dilemma of Legitimation 
A most noteworthy finding in my research was that the question 
of legitimating the occupation—i.e., whether, through their 
participation in the judicial process, they take part in strengthening its 
legitimacy—was familiar to almost all lawyers. Most of them 
responded that they understood the dilemma and acknowledged it, but 
refused to take responsibility for it. Their main argument was that in 
general, representation is not a professional decision - neither a 
collective nor an individual one. They rejected any attempt to impose 
the burden of legitimation upon the lawyers. Only one lawyer said that 
she thinks about the dilemma every time she appears in court, but still, 
she stated that it is not a strong enough reason for her to abandon the 
practice. 
The reason articulated by the lawyers was that representation in 
the military courts was a practice accepted by the political collective to 
which they belonged, represented by the PA and the Office for 
Prisoners’ Affairs. After all, the salary of many lawyers originates from 
the PA’s budget. Hence, if the PA (representing the Palestinians) does 
not want legal representation in the military courts to take place, it 
could order so. As long as it does not, representation is not a personal-
professional decision, but a national-collective one. 
H. Back to the Question of Professionalism 
Asked at the end of my questionnaire if they feel that they can be 
“a good lawyer” in the military courts, most lawyers answered in the 
affirmative, with reference to the individual aspects of their practice. 
They identified and emphasized personal agency as grounds for this 
answer. If the lawyer makes the effort to read the police files, if she 
analyzes the evidence against her client, keeps up with legal precedent, 
takes advantage of mishaps that occurred during interrogation, and 
articulates a sound legal argument when possible, then one can be a 
good lawyer. 
One lawyer estimated that it is probably better to represent a client 
accused of a security offense in the military court compared to the civil 
court in Israel. Here, he explained, everyone is accused of a security 
offense; it is the rule not the exception, and conduct is measured by a 
relative scale of severity, which is different than in an Israeli court. The 
political conflict that bore the judicial process is “the normal,” the 
everyday reality within which military judges, prosecutors, and defense 
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lawyers conduct their affairs. The insular nature of the court is an 
advantage, which persistent and professional lawyers can use to benefit 
their clients. 
Hence, the defense lawyers managed to construct a space, 
although temporary and highly restrictive, that provided them with a 
sense of professional competence and identity. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The literature on the legitimizing effect of law on political and 
social change is well established. A significant portion of it points to 
the depoliticizing effects of law on political struggles.112 At the center 
of this critique stands the practice of impact litigation, or legal reform 
litigation, in which lawyers proactively approach the courts, seek 
redress for rights violations, and ask courts to create change by 
establishing legal precedents that become general obligatory norms.113 
In the context of the Israeli occupation, such proactive legal 
strategy has been used extensively. The strategy has been used through 
direct petitions to the Israeli Supreme Court against acts of the military 
government, and to some extent through civil damages suits litigated 
before the Israeli civil courts on behalf of civilians injured or killed by 
Israeli security forces.114 
The legal course adopted by Israeli and Palestinian civil society 
organizations, to petition the Israeli Supreme Court for legal remedies, 
has been contentious.115 The controversy over impact litigation of this 
sort had intensified as the occupation has continued, given the overall 
assessment that, in the long run, its costs will have become greater than 
its benefits.116 To be sure, occasionally the Supreme Court has provided 
 
112.  See, e.g., STUART A. SHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS, LAWYERS, PUBLIC 
POLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1974). 
113.  GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (Univ. of Chi. Press, 2d ed., 2008). 
114.  DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISREAL 
AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (2002); Gilat J. Bachar, Access Denied – Using Procedure to 
Restrict Tort Litigation: Lessons from the Israeli-Palestinian Experience, 92 Cʜɪ.-Kᴇɴᴛ L. Rᴇᴠ. 
841 (2018). 
115.  Kretzmer, supra note 11; Ronen Shamir, Landmark Cases and the Reproduction of 
Legitimacy: The Case of Israel’s High Court of Justice, 24 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 781, 781 (1990). 
116.  Kretzmer, supra note 11; Ben Naftali, supra note 56; George E. Bisharat, Law, Land 
and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 467, 562 (1994); 
Behnam Dayanim, The Israeli Supreme Court and the Deportations of Palestinians: The 
Interaction of Law and Legitimacy, 30 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 143 (1994). 
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an ad hoc remedy or restricted the military government, but with most 
“hard cases,” such as house demolitions, targeted killings, the legality 
of the settlements, and deportations—it has sided with the government, 
providing it with an aura of legality and legitimacy. As David Kretzmer 
explains, “[i]t would be naïve to think that a domestic court could deal 
with such an anomalous situation as if it were an outside, neutral, 
observer that is oblivious to the political realities in its own country.”117 
At first blush, the topic of this Article escapes this critique. The 
lawyers subject of this Article are not initiating litigation in military 
courts or calling for court intervention. They do not harness the law to 
bring about change, but use law in its most traditional role—as a shield 
to protect individuals from state power. Their appearance before the 
courts is defensive rather than proactive, and hardly involves 
reformative legal argumentation. 
Nevertheless, there are significant depoliticizing aspects to 
defense lawyering as well. As Ronen Shamir and Sarah Chinsky note, 
for the criminal defense lawyer to achieve the best result on behalf of 
her client, she must remove and disassociate the client as much as 
possible from the political context in which the offense was allegedly 
committed.118 The accused must minimize his involvement with the act 
against the occupier, rather than stand behind what is often considered 
an act of resistance. 
From an institutional perspective, the military government has a 
strong interest to portray the military courts as a judicial system that 
resembles a civil justice system, completely detached from the non-
democratic base of its apparatus. This contributes to normalizing the 
occupation, with a legitimizing and a pacifying effect. What is 
considered by the occupied as resistance, is transformed into a criminal 
offense, and at times an act of terror. Channeling such acts into the 
military courts, which gradually assume the features of a fair judicial 
process—including strong reliance on defense lawyers—depoliticizes 
the reality in which the military courts operate. 
 
117.  Kretzmer, supra note 11, at 236. 
118.  Ronen Shamir & Sara Chinsky, Destruction of Houses and Construction of a Cause: 
Lawyers and Bedouins in Israeli Courts, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS 
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 227 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); Neta 
Ziv, Lawyers Talking Rights and Clients Breaking Rules: Between Legal Positivism and 
Distributive Justice in Israeli Poverty Lawyering, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 209 (2004). 
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Palestinian defense lawyers have been operating in the military 
courts amidst this contradiction for many decades, and from the 
interviews conducted seem well aware of the dynamics described 
above. However, over time, these arguments have lost much of their 
force. They have largely been relegated to the books of critical scholars, 
hovering above the day-to-day work of the Palestinian defense lawyers 
in the military courts of the occupation. 
After fifty years of occupation, the lawyers have no illusions: law 
has neither the power to obstruct the occupation, nor to significantly 
contribute to its continuance. It offers very little opportunity for 
resistance, but it is hardly a force of legitimation. 
It seems the lawyers have developed justifications for their 
practice within boundaries of a reasoning that is largely constructed by 
the enclosed military court system. The involvement of the PA in 
funding lawyers’ defense takes part in institutionalizing their practice. 
Their special responsibility vis-à-vis their clients’ families bestows 
upon them a unique role that no one else can fulfill. 
The formalization and improvement of the courts’ procedures 
offer opportunities for some lawyers to exhibit professionalism and 
enhanced lawyering skills. Even the internal stratification—the 
differentiation between lawyers who serve their clients professionally 
and those who do less so—contributes to this process. It assists in 
creating a self-imagined experience of professionalism that thrives 
within the confines of a perplexing judicial regime. 
On the one hand, the military court embraces the lawyers. It fully 
integrates them within its process; it greatly depends on them to 
maintain the judicial scheme, and the lawyers seem aware of this 
entanglement. The court engages the lawyers in a professional 
interaction, constructing an experience of familiarity and mutual 
understanding about the rules of the legal game, as well as its 
boundaries. At the same time, the Palestinian defense lawyers will 
always remain outsiders in this system. They will never truly belong to 
the community that established the military courts, with which they 
continuously engage. At the end of the court day, the lawyers—
Palestinians and Israelis alike—return to a place, where the external 
political reality overshadows any real or imagined sense of justice they 
may have envisioned in the military court. 
